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Abstract 
 
This paper presents an examination of the evolution and economic functions of business 
groups––often designated as zaibatsu––in prewar Japan. First, after providing an 
overview of the emergence of prewar business groups, the ownership, organization, and 
business portfolios of various business group types are summarized. Secondly, four 
hypotheses related to the competitive capabilities of the business groups are presented 
and evaluated: the financial role of internal markets, scale and scope of economies, 
synergy and spillover effects, and effective monitoring of subsidiary firms, based on 
earlier research that emphasized positive features of business groups. Third, their 
negative traits are specifically examined, such as entrenchment and tunneling, and 
over-investment and under-investment. Fourth, results are presented demonstrating how 
various business groups affect performance. Finally, we provide insights into the 
commonality and uniqueness of prewar business groups in comparison with postwar 
business groups in Japan, and with business groups in currently emerging economies. 
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1.? INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution and economic function of 
business groups, often referred to as zaibatsu, in prewar Japan. Japan is the only country 
outside of Europe and North America to industrialize successfully prior to World War II. 
During Japan’s industrialization process, business groups emerged as a prominent form 
of corporate organization.   
 It should be noted, however, that in spite of the prominence of the zaibatsu as 
economic actors, the share of business groups in the prewar economy was not as high as 
often assumed. In fact, when compared to business groups in other developing countries 
such as Korea or Thailand, or even in the U.S. or U.K. in the early twentieth century, 
and in postwar Japan, where bank-centered business groups were predominant, business 
groups in prewar Japan had a much lower share of overall economic activity. According 
to HCLC (1951), the largest nine zaibatsu accounted for 19% of total paid-in capital in 1937, 
while all business groups accounted for 35% of the largest 100 industrial firms (asset 
base) in the same year. While the share of business groups in an economy will vary 
depending on definitions of business groups and dates of estimation, their prewar share 
was also modest when compared to the shares of their counterparts in current 
developing economies (Khanna and Yafeh 2007).  In prewar Japan, most large firms 
operated as stand-alone entities, and most of them were listed on the stock exchange.  
To put it differently, the prewar Japanese economy was not dominated by business 
groups, and instead was characterized by the co-existence of business groups and 
stand-alone (independent) firms.1  
Prewar business groups are defined as a set of legally independent firms that are 
wholly or partly owned by a holding company or a parent firm. Family or entrepreneurs, 
sometimes exclusively, owned the holding or parent company, and kept effective 
control over group firms. The holding or parent company pyramidically (some of 
subsidiary firms are listed) or hierarchically (most of them are unlisted) organized the 
multi-tiered subsidiaries, which businesses commonly diversified into multiple sectors2. 
?????????????????????????????????????????
1 Refer to Shibagaki (1968), and recent works of Okazaki (1999a, 1999b). Franks, Mayer and 
Miyajima (2009) also documented the co-existence of business groups and stand-alone firms, 
focusing on ownership structures. ?
?? The term 'hierarchical' is employed here to imply control structure where most of the subsidiaries 
in a business group are unlisted. Although the term 'hierarchical' normally encompasses pyramidal 
structures having listed subsidiaries, it has been used here to imply non-pyramidal business 
groups. This division has been necessary to distinguish groups where control is disproportionate to 
the ownership.?
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Sharing these traits, however, prewar business groups showed non-trivial differences. 
Figure 1 is a three-dimensional rendering of the differences in the characteristics of the 
various types of business groups as reflected in three criteria:  whether groups have a 
holding company at the apex or not, whether the apex and group firms are privately or 
publicly held, and extent of diversification.  The size of the balloons for each business 
group type are of different sizes to reflect differences in the aggregate percentage shares 
of the assets of the 100 largest firms in 1937 held by the groups and subsidiary firms 
within each group category. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
The first type of business group (Type I) was comprised of the Three Established 
zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo).  They were family-controlled pyramid 
groups, with private holding companies at their apex and widely diversified subsidiaries 
ranging from finance and trading to manufacturing and mining.  They held the largest 
share of the asset of top 100 industrial firms at nearly 19%.  Type II business groups 
consisted of the smaller zaibatsu, which shared traits with Type I such as family 
ownership and private holding companies at the apex, but their systems of control were 
less elaborate. Its group structure is hierarchical in some cases, and their level of 
diversification was much more modest. The Type II business group share of the assets 
of the top 100 industrial firms dramatically declined during the interwar period to 3.2 % 
in 1937 from 15.6% in 1921 due to the bankruptcy of some groups.  The Type III 
business groups had publicly held firms at their apex and were led by distinguished 
entrepreneurs.  Among them, Nissan was unique with a publicly held holding company 
at its apex with pyramid structure (Type IIIa in Figure 1).  Nissan had widely 
diversified its businesses even though it did not establish financial and trading firms, 
and had emerged as the third largest business group in 1937 with a 7% share of the 
assets of the top 100 industrial firms. Other corporate groups are categorized as Type 
IIIb groups because they shared with Nissan features such as entrepreneurial founders 
and public ownership but did not have a holding company at their apex.  Type IIIb 
business groups attempted only limited diversification, primarily vertically at high tech 
sectors, and thus were often referred to as industrial business groups (establishing a 
model for the postwar vertical keiretsu).3  Most Type I and II groups can trace their 
?????????????????????????????????????????
?? Among them were the local zaibatsu, whose business coverage was limited to a specific 
geographical area. See Morikawa (1976) for a more detailed description.?
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beginnings to the mass privatization drive of the mid-1880s, while Type III groups 
emerged or expanded in the 1930s against the backdrop of the stock market boom.   
 Focusing on the Established Three zaibatsu and Nissan, this paper examines how 
business groups in prewar Japan evolved, and what functions they served. To support 
our analysis, we constructed a micro data base on ownership, capital composition, and 
performance for the prewar period. It is comprised of the 159 manufacturing and mining 
firms that appeared on the list of the top 100 firms at least once during 1921, 1928, and 
1937.   
The next section provides an overview of the emergence of prewar business groups.  
Section 3 summarizes the ownership, organization, and business portfolios of the 
various business group types. Section 4 addresses the competitive capabilities of 
business groups, addressing the hypothesis put forth in earlier research that emphasizes 
the positive features of business groups: scale and scope of economies, synergy and 
spillover effects, financial role of internal markets, and effective monitoring of 
subsidiary firms. Section 5 examines their negatives traits including phenomena such as 
entrenchment and tunneling, and over- and under-investment. Section 6 shows how the 
various types of business groups affect performance.  In the last section, we provide 
insights on the commonality and uniqueness by prewar business groups with postwar 
business groups in Japan, and business groups in currently emerging economies as well.  
 
2.? EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS GROUPS 
In contrast to the postwar Japanese economy, the prewar Japanese economy was 
basically liberal and open from the time of the establishment of a modern capitalist 
system in the Meiji period.  Tariffs were generally set very low due partly to the 
unequal treaties with the developed countries (Japan did not acquire full tariff autonomy 
until 1911), and partly to a careful consideration of the benefits of trade.  Up to the 
early 1930s, there were few restrictions on inflows and outflows of capital, and foreign 
direct investment played a crucial role especially in the high-tech area.  A legal 
framework for corporations had been established and property rights were well 
protected, but economic activities were only loosely regulated, and there were no 
regulations explicitly governing the shareholding of firms and banks. A modern 
corporate law was enacted in 1899, modeled after German civil law. An application of 
the recent law and finance framework (La Porta et al. 1998) will show that investor 
protections earn a low score of only one out of a maximum score of six (Franks, Mayer 
and Miyajima 2009).  Given the relatively liberal economic environment, and limited 
investor protections, business groups and publicly held stand-alone firms chose to 
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organize themselves in a variety of ways.  Let us begin with a brief overview of the 
events that are signposts in the evolution of business groups in Japan (outlined in Table 
1).    
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
2.1.? Establishment and Spurt: Privatization of state-owned firms  
Many business groups in prewar Japan can trace their origins to the mass privatization 
drive that was implemented in the mid-1880s.  The new modern factories and facilities 
that the Meiji government established after the Meiji Restoration frequently encountered 
operational difficulties and financial troubles. Minister of Finance, Masayoshi 
Matsukata, decided to sell off state-owned enterprises in almost all areas except 
munitions. As a result, coal and metal mining companies, machinery manufacturers, and 
shipbuilding and textiles firms were transferred into private hands. By 1896, the state 
had privatized 26 large SOEs. 
    The buyers were wealthy families such as the Mitsui, and emerging entrepreneurs 
such as Iwasaki? (later Mitsubishi), Yasuda, Asano, Furukawa and others.  These firms 
were purchased at prices much lower than their book values.4  But this was not 
surprising because many of the SOEs had performed poorly, and operated at a loss.  
The families and entrepreneurs that acquired the former SOEs succeeded in bringing 
them into the black through transfers of business know-how and management skills.?
As a result of the state’s sell-off of SOEs, the zaibatsu acquired enterprises that later 
became cash cows.  Mitsui, for example, bought Miike Mining, which became one of 
its core businesses during its early growth stages, while Mitsubishi acquired Nagasaki 
Shipyard, and the Takashima and other mining operations, all of which became major 
profit centers. 
 
2.2.? Industrialization and the World War I boom (1890-1919)?  
Japan began its modern economic growth around the turn of the century.5  The Three 
Established zaibatsu -- Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo -- continued to grow as they 
?????????????????????????????????????????
??Mitsubishi (Iwasaki) bought Nagasaki Shipbuilding, whose book value was 1,130,949 yen, for 
459,000 yen. See Morck and Nakamura (2008) and Kobayashi (1977) for more details.? Sumitomo 
was reluctant to purchase SOEs because it was wary of the political risks.  
?? There is a broad consensus among Japanese economic historians that Japan’s industrial 
revolution began sometime between the 1890s and 1900s. Rostow (1956) also suggests that the 
Japanese economy’s takeoff into modern economic growth began by 1900 and by 1914 at the 
latest.?
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entered their next phase of development.  Mitsui, whose core businesses were 
originally in mining, trading, and banking, diversified into businesses ranging from 
paper to textiles, with the Mitsui Bank playing a leading role. In 1895, Mitsubishi added 
banking to its business portfolio by merging local banks, and it built a vast business 
group that encompassed a wide variety of businesses ranging from mining and 
shipbuilding to finance. The Sumitomo zaibatsu, whose core businesses were copper 
mining (Besshi Copper Mining) and banking, began to expand through diversification 
into related businesses.  Sumitomo acquired downstream industries such as copper 
refiners, processors, and smelters.  In this phase, mergers and acquisitions played a 
central role in growth strategies, and the three zaibatsu grew steadily. In our rough 
estimation, the total assets of the three zaibatsu in 1914, prior to the outbreak of WWI, 
accounted for 18.3% of the aggregate assets of the top 100 industrial firms.6  
As a result of active diversification, the three zaibatsu gradually devised their own 
group structures, and thus established. Motivated by the tax reform instituted during the 
Russo-Japanese War (that made the joint stock company preferable to other forms in 
corporate tax, while the received dividend of firms continue to be tax exemption), 
Mitsui, the largest business group at the time, chose to incorporate its headquarters 
(Mitsui Omotokata) into a holding company in the legal form of a partnership with 
limited liabilities, and its first-tier firms into joint stock companies in 1909.  Mitsubishi 
followed this organizational innovation in 1918? by spinning off its multi-divisional 
units, while Sumitomo established its holding company in 1921 and spun off its 
in-house divisions in stages.  Other second-rank family groups also established holding 
companies in 1917 and 1920. (see Table 1) 
The industrialization process, which was initially driven by the textile, railway, 
and electricity industries, was given an added fillip with the establishment of heavy 
industries after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).  Following in the footsteps of 
the Three Established zaibatsu and other family business groups, a second generation of 
entrepreneurs emerged during this new incorporation boom.  Suzuki Shoten, which 
was originally established as a sugar merchant, gradually enlarged its business. Nippon 
Chisso (a chemical firm), and Kuhara Mining, the forerunner of the later Nissan group, 
were also established in the early 1900s.  World War I provided a big boost to the new 
entrepreneurial firms, enabling them to further expand their business networks. 
?????????????????????????????????????????
?? In 1914 Mitsui Gomei had total assets of 78 million yen, Mitsubishi Goshi 49 million yen, and 
Sumitomo 41 million yen. The assets of their three holding companies were added to the 
denominator. Note that since the assets of holding companies include non-manufacturing businesses, 
this share is not strictly comparable to the data in Table 2.? ?
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Particularly active were Suzuki, Kuhara, and Kawasaki, which are often referred to as 
the ?Taisho? (the name of an era from 1912 to 1926) zaibatsu. Suzuki, for example, 
expanded into shipping, iron and steel, and synthetic fiber (Teikoku Jinken Co.), 
utilizing its huge profits from wartime trading.  By 1920, the Suzuki group was almost 
as large as Mitsui. Kuhara Mining newly entered into trading (Kuhara Trading Co), 
shipping (Nippon Kisen) and shipbuilding (Osaka Iron Works), while the Kuhara group 
incorporated and spun off its former in-house electric machine division (Hitachi 
Seisaku-jo). Table 2 shows the number of group firms and group-firm percentage 
shares of the assets of the top 100 firms in the mining and manufacturing sectors in 
1921. The Three Established Zaibatsu had nine firms among the top 100 industrial firms, 
which accounted for 18.8% of the total assets of the top 100, while other types of 
groups had 13 firms, and accounted for a share of 21.3% of top 100 total assets.  
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
2.3.? Interwar period: the stable growth of Three Established zaibatsu and the 
emergence of new zaibatsu (1920-1937) 
The post WWI boom ended in March 1920, after which the Japanese economy entered 
into a deflationary period that continued for more than a decade and exerted severe 
pressure on some family-controlled groups. Suzuki Shoten and Kawasaki Shipbuilding 
had been highly dependent on leverage for their growth during WWI, and were hit hard 
by the economic shock of declining prices and shrinking demand. In 1927, both 
companies faced serious financial distress and had to be reconstructed under bank 
control. The family owners were forced to retire, and Suzuki Gomei was dissolved.  As 
a result, the share of Type II groups declined from 15.6% in 1921 to 3.2 % in 1937.  
By contrast, the Three Established zaibatsu adhered to a conservative strategy 
during the deflationary period, and adapted their businesses to shrinking demand by 
rationalizing their businesses and balance sheets.  While the diversification of the 
Established Three into manufacturing slowed, they newly entered into other areas of 
finance including the trust business and insurance (Hashimoto and Takeda 1992: 
chap.2).  
After the gold standard was abolished in December 1931, the Japanese economy 
rebounded more rapidly than most other countries that were experiencing the Great 
Depression. Low interest rates, government fiscal policy, the Manchuria Incident, and a 
stock market boom contributed to the early economic recovery.  This stock market 
boom was exceptional, bucking the global trend of depressed stock markets (Rajan and 
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Zingales 2003). Taking advantage of this economic boom, the Three Established 
zaibatsu began to turn to external funds for financing in the 1930s, and took their first- 
and second-tier subsidiary firms public.  
But the Type III groups led by new entrepreneurs were even more aggressive in 
utilizing these favorable macroeconomic conditions. Nissan, Nippon Soda, and Nippon 
Chisso came to be known as the “new” zaibatsu.  Their talented entrepreneurs made 
the decision to expand into high-tech sectors such as electronics, chemical, and 
aluminum. They enlarged their businesses very rapidly through IPOs, new seasoned 
issues, and mergers and acquisitions through exchanges of stock that was highly valued 
by the stock market.  Their growth could indeed be described as stock market driven.  
The share of Type III groups increased from 5.7% in 1921 to 13.6% in 1937. 
 
2.4.? Expansion of business groups during wartime (1937-1945) 
The growth of business groups was accelerated by the wartime planned economy, which 
triggered a decentralization of their governance structure.  The war had a twofold 
impact on the evolution of business groups.  First, government policy influenced the 
organization and strategy of business groups. Some reformist military officers and 
government officials were highly critical of shareholders in general, and zaibatsu 
families in particular. The enactment of the State Mobilization Law in 1938 enabled the 
government to intervene in important corporate decisions. The government used the 
new law to restrict dividend payments and compensation at firms from 1939.  The 
Munitions Company Law in 1943 made it possible for government to appoint the CEO 
of designated companies, and suspend the decision-making of general shareholder 
meetings if necessary. These procedures gradually restricted the ability of families to 
exercise effective control over their subsidiary firms (Okazaki 1999a; Hoshi and 
Kashyap 2001; Miyajima 2004: chap. 6).   
Second, although anti-zaibatsu sentiment was widespread, wartime realities were 
such that the economy could not operate smoothly without the active involvement of 
zaibatsu-affiliated firms. Consequently, resource allocation by the planning agency 
tended to give priority to the zaibatsu-affiliated firms, especially from 1939. On the 
other hand, firms had a strong incentive to organize their own networks because the 
supply of materials was increasingly constrained, and their systems for distributing 
resources were far more efficient. The planned economy provided an advantage to 
internal transactions (within groups) and placed external transactions (through 
distribution agencies) at a disadvantage, and thus served to promote a slew of mergers 
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and acquisitions, and alliances with other firms (Hashimoto and Takeda 1992; chap. 3; 
Miyajima 2004: chap. 6). 
Consequently, business groups increased their share of the economy.  Firms 
affiliated with the Three Established zaibatsu firms accounted for 25.6% of the assets of 
the top 100 firms in 1942, while the other types of groups also grew rapidly (Table 2)7. 
The new Type ? business groups, whose main businesses were closely tied to wartime 
demand, also expanded, and strengthened their vertical group networks. Along with 
existing business groups, other entrepreneur firms (Matsushita Electronics and Toyota 
Automobile) and managerial firms (Nippon Iron and Steel, Kanegafuchi Spinning) also 
began to organize vertical networks. Further, zaibatsu-affiliated firms (first- and 
second-tier firms) also organized their own vertical organizations. For instance, Hitachi, 
which was a first-tier firm of Nissan, set up its own vertical group network with its main 
supplier (Shimotani 1993).  
 Postwar reforms initiated by the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers targeted these expanded business groups. As its main 
targets, GHQ designated 56 families of 10 zaibatsu as well as 83 holding companies, 
which included 23 pure holding companies and 60 business enterprises with holding 
company traits.  The designated families, holding companies and zaibatsu line firms 
were mandated to transfer their stockholdings to the Holding Companies Liquidation 
Committee, which liquidated them in sales to the public with strict priority rules.  
GHQ also dissolved pure holding companies, and banned their future establishment 
(Article 9 of Anti-trust Law).  By GHQ’s order, the incumbent top managers who were 
appointed by designated holding companies (so-called zaibatsu appointees) were 
thoroughly purged from the business world. Subsequently, young salaried managers 
were promoted from within the firms to take over their positions.  Thus, these postwar 
reforms gave rise to a highly dispersed ownership structure with insider boards (Hadley 
1970; Miyajima 1994).  
     ?
3.? STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY 
3.1.? Ownership, Capital Composition and Governance 
Three Established Zaibatsu: Concentrated Ownership, Low Leverage, and Strict 
monitoring 
?????????????????????????????????????????
?? At war’s end, the four largest and ten largest zaibatsu accounted for 25%, and 35% of paid-in 
capital respectively (Hoshi and Kashyap 2001: 69; Hadley 1970).? ?
 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2009-006? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
?
??
The three established family-controlled groups had similar ownership, capitaland 
organizational structures.  To illustrate how they were organized, we will examine the 
structure of Mitsui, the largest zaibatsu. 
The Three Established Zaibatsu had a holding company, organized in the form of a 
partnership, at its apex.  Mitsui Gomei in 1909 took the form of a partnership with 
unlimited liability, while Mitsubishi Goshi followed in 1918 and Sumitomo Goshi 
followed in 1921 by forming partnerships with limited liability. The partnerships were 
comprised exclusively of members of the controlling families. In the Mitsui group, 
eleven families jointly held the shares of Mitsui Gomei and were not allowed to sell 
them.  The partnership form was maintained until the inheritance and dividend income 
tax was revised in 1937, inducing the group to reorganize its partnership into a joint 
stock company.8  In spite of the dominance of family members on the board of directors 
of the holding company, the Established Three Zaibatsu delegated professional 
managers (riji) to run their holding companies9.  The members of its professional 
board of directors were usually recruited from its first-tier subsidiaries (Bank, Trading 
Co. and Mining), so that they had sufficient knowledge of subsidiary operations.  
The ownership structure of the subsidiary was designed to ensure that it remained 
under the exclusive control of the holding company.  Banks and other financial 
institutions were the exception, however.  The controlling families were aware of the 
quasi-public traits of such companies, and thus allowed them to go public at an early 
stage.  However, the other manufacturing and mining firms that were spun off in the 
1910s and 1920s were initially exclusively owned by their holding companies. These 
firms did not go public until the 1930s, and even then the holding companies carefully 
maintained majority control through cross-shareholdings among group firms.  On the 
13 firms of Type I groups, the average percentage share held by the largest shareholder 
(C1), which is in fact identical to the share held by holding company, was 65.5% in 
1928 and 40.0 % in 1937 respectively (Table 3, panel A).  The cumulative share held 
by the five largest shareholders (C5) accounted for 83.1% of all shares in 1928 and still 
60.7% in 1937.  As long as group firms of the Big Three were less reliant on financing 
from the public, the wedge between control rights and cash flow rights remained 
relatively small.   
?????????????????????????????????????????
?? See Morck and Nakamura (2005) for a brief summary and Morikawa (1992) for a detailed 
description. The Mitsubishi holding company raised capital from the public for the first time in 
1940.?
?? This delegation could be traced back to the early Edo period (17th century) for Mitsui and 
Sumitomo. 
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Looking at their capital structure of the first-tier firms in the Three Established 
Three, they relied on a low level of leveraging. The families of the three zaibatsu had a 
strong preference for a healthy capital composition, so the average debt- asset ratio of 
group firms was significantly lower than that of stand-alone firms (Table 3, panel B). 
The average debt-asset ratio of the 14 first- and second-tier firms of the Three 
Established Zaibatsu (Type I) from 1921-37 was 32.7%, which was comparable to the 
36.1% of stand-alone firms, but considerably lower than the 46% plus for firms in Type 
II groups.  Panel C shows the estimation results which regressed the debt-asset ratio 
for the top 100 firms on some control variables (size, capital intensity, year dummy) and 
a zaibatsu dummy to avoid possible bias from unconditional comparison.  We find that 
the Type I (the Established Three) group dummy is significantly negative, and the 
estimated coefficient suggests that their debt-asset ratio is 5.5% lower than that of 
stand-alone firms. This result suggests that the characteristics of business groups 
affected their capital decisions. 
   ------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 3 about here 
   ------------------------------------------------- 
Given these ownership and capital structures, the corporate governance of the Three 
Established Zaibatsu was characterized by the strict monitoring of subsidiary firms by 
the holding company.  Applying standard terminology of agency theory, we can 
describe the investment projects of each subsidiary as being initiated by professional 
managers, whose proposed projects were then ratified by the holding company after 
weighing the financial implications. After obtaining ratification by the holding company, 
the top management of the first-tier firms implemented the investment projects. The 
holding company would then evaluate the performance of the projects, and take 
necessary action if its performance were substantially lower than originally planned.  
We would like to point out two aspects of the relationship between holding 
company and subsidiaries. On the one hand, the top managers of each subsidiary were 
guaranteed a greater degree of autonomy compared to that afforded in their former 
multi-divisional organizations. By providing legal status to the former divisions, their 
discretion (in the sense of Burkart, Grambo and Panunzi 1997) as salaried managers 
was substantially enhanced.  
On the other hand, however, ratification by the holding company was not a mere 
rubber stamp, but a substantive process. On occasion, the holding company overruled or 
modified projects proposed by professional managers, as was the case with Sumitomo 
Fertilizer’s plans to enter into the ammonia/nitrogen fertilizer sector in the late 1920s. 
The top management of this company initiated an adventurous investment plan with an 
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eye to economies of scale. However, its holding company, Sumitomo Goshi, strictly 
vetted the plan, and encouraged Fertilizer to modify it to reduce the technological risks.  
The plan that was ultimately implemented was based upon the introduction of 
technology from a foreign partner with cost that far exceeded the original budget, so the 
holding company criticized the top manager of Fertilizer, and finally dismissed him.  
Sumitomo Goshi did not approve subsequent investment plans during the Showa 
depression either, insisting that any investments should be suspended under such 
uncertain conditions (Hashimoto and Takeda 1992: 120; Miyajima 2004: 187).  This 
example shows that real authority, as this concept is used by Aghion and Tirole (1997?, 
was wielded by the holding company.   
As illustrated by the above example, the main tools for wielding control over 
first-tier firms were personnel appointments, and the allocation of financial resources. 
The CEO of the first-tier firm was appointed by the holding company, and often rotated 
among subsidiary firms. Personnel management was fully centralized in the Established 
Three.10  On the other hand, the holding company also exercised strict financial control 
over affiliated firms. Budgets, settlements, and dividend payments required ratification 
from the holding company. Affiliated firms were also required to submit detailed 
financial statements to the holding company every half year.  Investment plans that 
exceeded internal funding capacity required ratification by the holding company, so the 
top management of the first-tier firms did not have autonomy over capital decisions.  
Furthermore, it is documented that at Mitsubishi, temporal surpluses associated with 
operations were deposited at the holding company during the 1920s (Asajima 1983). 
Such strict financial controls may have enabled the holding company to mitigate the 
free cash flow problem at subsidiary firms.  
 
Nissan and other Groups 
Unlike the Three Established Zaibatsu (Type I), the medium-sized family groups 
(Type II) did not have well-organized holding companies, and were less likely to 
delegate professional managers to operate group firms. Since these families had a strong 
incentive to maintain at least a controlling majority over their subsidiaries, they tended 
to raise funds through external sources in the form of debt, consequently, their 
organizational structure is sometimes hierarchical rather pyramidical (see Table 4).  
?????????????????????????????????????????
??? Refer to Morikawa (1980) for Mitsui, Asajima (1983) for Mitsubishi, and Asajima, eds. (1987) 
for the Three Zaibatsu. Miyajima (2004, chap 4) also provides a brief description. Kawamoto and 
Miyajima (2008) show that the turnover of presidents of zaibatsu firms was less sensitive to 
corporate performance compared to stand-alone firms, suggesting that holding companies rotated top 
managers among their group firms. 
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Panel B of Table 3 shows that the debt-asset ratio of Type II firms was significantly 
higher than that of Type I and stand-alone firms.   
Nissan was a unique business group in prewar Japan because the holding company 
at its apex was publicly held, and it had a highly dispersed ownership structure. Kuhara 
Mining, the forerunner of Nissan, already had 14,277 shareholders in 1921 with a C3 of 
31.1%.? ? In 1926, Kuhara Mining faced financial difficulties due to failed speculation in 
a trading business that was newly established during WWI. ? Fusanosuke Kuhara asked 
his brother-in-law, Yoshisuke Ayukawa, to take over as CEO of this company. His 
basic scheme for drastic corporate restructuring was to newly establish Nippon Mining 
as the operating company and to transfer Kuhara Mining’s fixed assets to Nippon 
Mining through exchange of stock. Kuhara Mining, which had now become a pure 
holding company, changed its name to Nippon Sangyo (Nissan is its abbreviation). 
   Ayukawa had a clear strategy that viewed the holding company as a vehicle for 
raising money from public investors.(Ayukawa 1934)  Nissan group, whose size was 
modest at the end of 1920s, grew rapidly through M&A and IPOs in the 1930s, in 
tandem with the stock market boom.  In 1932, Nissan decided to hold IPOs for its 
subsidiaries (Hitachi, and Nippon Mining), while Nissan itself also issued new stock for 
the purpose of investing in existing subsidiaries and acquiring firms in new areas such 
as foods, chemicals, and fisheries. (Wada 1937; Udagawa 1984).   
As a result, the ownership structure of Nissan in 1937 was completely dispersed 
with 51,804 shareholders, and C3 of 5.6%, while Ayukawa held only 3.1% of Nissan 
shares.  Nissan as a holding company had a majority stake in its first-tier firms, which 
in turn held a controlling majority in the second-tier firms.  In this sense, the Nissan 
group was publicly financed and its pyramid structure was accompanied by a large 
wedge between control rights and cash flow rights (Morck and Nakamura 2005). Nissan 
exercised less control over subsidiary firms and had a more decentralized structure than 
the Three Established Zaibatsu.   
 
3.2.? Group Structure and Business Portfolio 
Three Established Zaibatsu 
Table 4 illustrates group structure and the business portfolios of groups 1937.  Taking 
pyramid structure, the Three Established Zaibatsu diversified into almost all sectors 
except textiles. They commonly had influential banks, insurance companies, and mining 
firms in their first tier. Mitsui and Mitsubishi group also had their general trading 
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firms.11  These first-tier firms formed the core of each group, and were highly 
profitable and cash cows for most of the prewar period. Obviously, the banking, trading, 
and mining companies operated in unrelated sectors, so diversification contributed to 
the stabilization of zaibatsu profitability as a whole.   
On the other hand, however, once these first-tier core companies were curved out 
around the time of WWI, they become main drivers of further diversification. For 
instance, one of the most active players was general treading company, Mitsui & Co., 
which founded a shipbuilding company in 1917, purchased an iron and steel firm in 
1924, and established Toyo Rayon to enter into synthetic textiles. In 1937, Mitsui & Co. 
held a majority stake in 22 subsidiaries and held 76.3 million yen in securities which 
was accounted for 13.9 % of total assets (Mitsui Bunko 1994; HCLC 1951).   
  ------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 4 about here 
  ------------------------------------------------- 
After WWI, the first-tier firms diversified mainly into related fields, and did so 
through internal growth, and not through M&A. For instance, the mining companies of 
the Big Three Zaibatsu diversified into chemicals (dyestuffs or fertilizers) using their 
knowledge of coal mining, and spun off companies. Mitsubishi Shipbuilding curved out 
its former in-house electric machine division in an alliance with Westinghouse, and 
entered into the aviation sector, using its engine technology. In the 1920s, the Three 
Established Zaibatsu hardly ever merged with or acquired other firms, except when they 
were involved in restructuring efforts. The low level of M&A activity can be attributed 
to the limited supply of potential targets in the new high-tech industries, and concerns 
about the organizational costs associated with mergers and acquisitions. The zaibatsu 
firms had elaborate promotion and training systems, which enabled them to gradually 
accumulate organizational assets, so they may have been reluctant to acquire other firms 
which could bring high adjustment costs.  
 
Nissan and other groups 
In both smaller family groups (Type II) and new business groups (Type III), taking 
either pyramidical and hierarchical structure of group firms, the scope of diversification 
was relatively narrow as shown in Table 4.  Some business groups diversified 
primarily into finance (Yasuda), and the others (Suzuki, Kawasaki and Nippon Chisso) 
did not have their own financial institutions, although some (Furukawa and Asano) had 
?????????????????????????????????????????
??? Sumitomo had its sales division within its holding company, which was spun off during the 
postwar zaibatsu dissolution program.   
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entered into these businesses only to fail.  Furukawa diversified its business from 
copper into wiring and electronics.  Kawasaki newly entered into iron and steel, and 
aviation using its windfall earnings during WWI.  In all these cases, the diversification 
was directed toward related areas.  
Among the Type II and III groups, Nissan was unique in its decision to adopt an 
unrelated diversification strategy. Ayukawa thought that one of the advantages of 
establishing a holding company system was the ability to stabilize profits (Ayukawa 
1934; Morck and Nakamura 2008).  He also strongly believed that businesses which 
catered to the lifestyles of the expanding growing middle class had tremendous potential.  
His belief prompted Nissan to enter into the automobile field as well as to establish the 
largest fishery and seafood processing firm (Nippon Suisan) through M&As. As a result, 
Nissan became the third largest group in Japan in 1937, with first- and second-tier firms 
in mining, manufacturing, distribution, and insurance.   
 
4.? COMPETIVIVE CAPABILITIES OF PREWAR BUSINESS GROUPS  
4.1.? Scale and Scope of Economy: Synergy and Spillover 
Given the unique characteristics of prewar business groups described above, what kind 
of competitive capabilities did they bring to the table?  And what role did they play in 
spurring economic growth in Japan?   
First, as first movers, the zaibatsu possessed managerial skill, know-how, 
accounting standards, and monitoring systems which provided them with real 
advantages, given the imperfections in the managerial, labor, and capital markets.12 At 
the beginning of Japanese industrialization, the zaibatsu sustained a dominant position 
in their core businesses. This dominance made it possible for them to collect large 
quasi-monopolistic rents, enabling them to rely on their internal capital markets to 
innovate continuously.  Furthermore, the sustained profits provided job security and 
relatively high compensation to corporate insiders, and allowed them to invest in 
firm-specific human capital.  These factors enabled the zaibatsu to become the major 
technology innovators (Odagiri and Goto 1995). 
Mitsui Mining’s entry into the dyestuffs market illustrates how the zaibatsu used 
their advantages.  In the prewar period, the dyestuffs market was originally dominated 
by German oligopoly firms (later IG Farben).  Once WWI erupted, and imports 
?????????????????????????????????????????
??? The zaibatsu recruited top managers and technicians with high salaries, which might have 
affected the allocation of talent, and possibly discouraged talented people from seeking careers in 
government. (Morikawa 1980: 16-19).  On the other hand, by the turn of the century at the latest, 
the zaibatsu had become a supplier of managerial talent. (Hashimoto and Takeda 1992: chap.1) ?
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stopped, the price of dyestuffs soared. However, dyestuffs were considered high-tech 
goods at the time, and dyestuff patents were monopolized by the German oligopoly.  
Mitsui Mining’s resources, however, allowed it to provide substitutes for foreign 
imports (Miyajima 2004?chap. 3?.  
Second, given serious market imperfections in the prewar era, business groups, and 
especially general trading companies, filled a crucial role. Mitsui & Co. was the sole 
sales agent of Mitsui Mining, and helped to increase coal sales volume and reduce 
transaction costs. The company also helped group firms to introduce new technology 
from foreign firms, lowering the cost of searching for technology, and intermediating 
transactions between foreign and groups firms. Furthermore, Mitsui & Co. played a 
significant role in importing cotton spinning machines from Pratt Brothers, for example. 
It arranged technology deals not only for firms within the Mitsui group but also for 
other spinning firms, and also played an intermediary role in supplying locomotives to 
railways and chemical machines for nitrogen production.  The activities of trading 
firms such as Mitsui & Co. had strong positive externalities.13 
Third, the trust and reputations that were built during the growth stage were also 
important to their competitiveness.  Around 1900 the word “zaibatsu” began to be used 
in journalism to refer to the family groups as a way of acknowledging their uniqueness 
and dominance. But the name of each zaibatsu also began to acquire its own brand value. 
The brand name provided strong advantages in their businesses under imperfect market 
conditions, as emphasized in Khanna and Yafeh (2007).  When foreign companies 
sought to directly invest in Japan by alliance or joint ventures, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, and Furukawa were among the handful of firms that could be trusted 
without having to invest substantial search and monitoring costs. For ordinary 
transactions, goods supplied by Mitsui & Co. were considered reliable and trustworthy.   
Furthermore, the enhanced brand value of zaibatsu also provided them with an 
advantage in recruiting talented employees. 
The zaibatsu carefully managed their brand names to maintain their reputations. For 
example, the Mitsui Group bestowed the Mitsui name to its first-tier firms, but gave the 
name Toyo to second-tier firms engaged in riskier businesses. Even dividend payments 
to minority shareholders were used to burnish the brand name.  Mitsubishi Mining, 
which was one of the first zaibatsu firms to go public at the beginning of 1920s, earned 
very low profits and only a 3-4% return on equity from 1921 to 1924. Though 
Mitsubishi Goshi, the holding company of the Mitsubishi held 58% of Mitsubishi 
?????????????????????????????????????????
???Morck and Nakamura (2007) emphasizes that zaibatsu served to provide a big push, and were a 
substitute for active government industrial policies by the World War One.?
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Mining stock, it declined to receive dividends, even though Mitsubishi Mining 
continued to pay out the same level of dividends to other shareholders (Miyajima 2004: 
Chap. 5).  By maintaining their trust and reputations, the zaibatsu could benefit in 
other ways such as by earning premiums on new share issues (Franks, Mayer and 
Miyajima 2009) 14.   
 
4.2.? Internal Capital Markets  
Business groups in prewar Japan also possessed another competitive capability: an 
advantage in capital allocation.  It is commonly understood that internal capital 
markets have played a significant role under market imperfections (Khanna and Yafeh 
2007). In the case of prewar Japan, massive investment and new entry into the 
high-technology sectors were supported by the internal capital markets of business 
groups.(Takeda 1993; Okazaki 1999b)  For the Three Established Zaibatsu, internal 
capital markets were particularly important during the early phase of industrialization.  
They invested their high profits from mining (a cash cow sector) into growth sectors 
such as chemicals and electric machinery.  
In the 1920s, outsider money was not often channeled to firms (divisions) with high 
growth opportunities because the holding company imposed a strict budget constraint 
on its subsidiaries.  In the 1930s, however, the Three Established Zaibatsu decided to 
allow their first-tier firms to go public, so internal capital markets began to play a role 
reallocating funds raised externally.? The Three Zaibatsu firms could raise capital for 
subsidiary firms through rights issues. The holding company paid the face value of the 
stock to the subsidiary and then sold the shares to the public at a higher offer price.  
For example, shares were created in Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Company in August 
1934 with a face value of 50 yen per share. The shares were then sold to the public for 65.0 
yen. This premium was used for donation, responding to to the soaring anti-zaibatsu 
sentiment in the early 1930s, and only a limited portion of it was used to purchase 
newly issued shares of group firms  (Takeda 1993?. In sum, the mechanism for 
channeling external funds to affiliated firms suggested by Morck and Nakamura (2005) 
was rarely tapped by the Three Established Zaibatsu.   
 
?????????????????????????????????????????
???Another reason for their high reputation is that zaibatsu were regarded as having good 
monitoring capabilities.  In the late 1920s, when some firms with dispersed ownership and 
interlocking directorships faced financial distress, zaibatsu-affiliated firms continued to turn in 
stable performances. Observers at the time criticized firms with dispersed ownership and 
interlocking outside directors, and recommended small investors invest in zaibatsu-related firms 
(Okazaki 1999b; Takahashi 1930).?
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Supplying patient capital and risk sharing 
The Three Established Zaibatsu also played an important role as a supplier of “patient 
capital” during business downturns.  After the WWI boom ended, most firms that had 
newly entered growth sectors such as shipbuilding, mining, iron and steel, and 
chemicals faced financial troubles under serious international competition, and had to 
reconstruct their businesses.  Some stand-alone firms went bankrupt, and others were 
downsized.  Even within the Three Established Zaibatsu, there were serious internal 
arguments over whether to continue the new businesses.  For example, Asahi Glass, 
which had newly entered into soda ash (Solvey Methode) production, faced serious 
competition from international giants (later Imperial Chemical Industry Co.) after WWI 
ended, and considered exiting this market.  However, Asahi Glass decided to continue 
the business, and even added investment to achieve the minimum optimal plant size.  
Similar scenarios unfolded in the iron and steel (Mitsubishi, and Mitsui) and dyestuffs 
(Mitsui) markets in the 1920s (Miyajima 2004; chap. 2). 
 
Channeling external funds to growth sectors 
On the other hand, Type II and III groups utilized both internal and external capital 
markets on a large scale to exploit new business opportunities.  During WWI, Type II 
business groups raised loans externally and distributed the funds to group firms through 
internal markets. For instance, Suzuki Shoten and Kawasaki Shipbuilding invested their 
high profits in new industries, in combination with new money raised through 
borrowing (Tsurumi 1974). 
In the 1930s, Type III groups, and Nissan in particular actively turned to the 
external market, using the proceeds from new share issues to invest in new businesses. 
For instance, Nissan sold shares in its first-tier firms (Hitachi and Nippon Mining) and 
invested the new money in the automobile industry.  Since the even the smallest 
automobile plant had to be quite large to optimize output, this industry could not be 
entered without getting a high premium. Thus, Nissan assumed a role in Japan’s 
development which resembled that of venture capital firms in the United States (Morck 
and Nakamura 2005: 397).  
Nissan also used its internal capital market and its reputation to engage in M&A and 
IPOs.  Ayukawa regarded food-related businesses as a growth area, and looked for 
appropriate targets in the early 1930s.  Nissan purchased the Nippon Ice Companies, a 
listed company, through exchange of stock (Wada 1937).  After reconstructing the 
business, Nissan spun off the firm as a separate legal entity, and let it go public through 
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an IPO at a substantial premium. In this case, it played a role that buyout firms fill 
today.  
     
5.? COST OF BUSINESS GROUPS IN PREWAR  
5.1.? Underinvestment by strict monitoring   
Prewar business groups also exacted costs.  One of these costs was excessively strict 
monitoring of subsidiaries (mainly first-tier firms) by the holding company. This cost, 
which is common to monitoring by large shareholders, as Shleifer and Vishney (1997) 
suggest, applied mainly to the Three Established Zaibatsu (Type I) groups. 
    When the holding company exercises strict monitoring over and applies a hard 
budget constraint on its subsidiaries, the investment level of its firms is likely to be 
lower than that of stand-alone firms, especially during business upturns.  It has been 
documented that the investments of Mitsubishi Shipbuilding were much more modest 
than that of other shipbuilders during WWI, and the investments of both Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi Mining in the 1930s were also much more modest than their industrial rivals 
(Morikawa 1980; Hashimoto 1992; Miyajima 2004: chap.4). Their reluctance to enter 
into high-tech industries such as chemicals and automobiles is further evidence of their 
conservatism.  In spite of frequent urging by the government and military authorities, 
the Three Established Zaibatsu decided not to enter into those industries (Morikawa 
1980). In general, the professional managers of subsidiary firms were seemingly 
hesitant to initiate risky investment projects, in light of strict monitoring, and a desire 
not to be overruled by the holding company.  
Miyajima (2004, chap. 5) estimated the standard investment function for testing 
whether internal funds and default risks (proxied by the debt-asset ratio) constrained the 
investment of groups firms.15 Although the results are still highly tentative due to 
limitations in the availability and reliability of data, the investments of Three Zaibatsu 
firms were much more sensitive to cash flow than that of other firms. Miyajima (2004) 
also found that the investments of the Three Zaibatsu firms were much more negatively 
sensitive to debt-asset levels. Higher leverage was likely to produce lower investment 
than stand-alone firms. Overall, the results are consistent with the understanding that the 
group firms of the Three Zaibatsu were constrained by their internal funds and capital 
structure. 
   
?????????????????????????????????????????
15 Using 68 large firms as a sample, Miyajima (2004) estimates the investment behavior of 
firms in the 1920s and 1930s. Since most zaibatsu firms were not listed, it uses the real growth 
rate of sales (or revenues) as a proxy for business opportunity.  
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5.2.? Entrenchment, Tunneling, and Overinvestment 
Prewar business groups in Japan were also accompanied by other costs including the 
tunneling and overinvestment effects that are part and parcel of business groups around 
the world (Morck, Wolfzon and Yeung 2005).  
In general, the pyramid structure of business groups entrenched the controlling 
families or entrepreneurs, shielding them from outside investors, and leading to various 
forms of tunneling such as excessive compensation, loan guarantees, dilutive share 
issues, insider trading, and other financial transactions that discriminated against 
minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000). Tunneling in this sense was observed in 
prewar business groups. For example, there was a considerable amount of price 
discrimination in the new issues among the Three Established Zaibatsu16. However, 
tunneling was not a serious issue among them, because the ownership structure of Type 
I groups was highly concentrated, and debt was carefully used as financial resources. 
Tunneling was much more severe in Type II and III business groups, however. A 
typical case was the Suzuki group, whose holding company, Suzuki Gomei, used 
subsidiary assets (Kobe Seiko and Teikoku Synthetic Fiber) as loan collateral. When 
Suzuki Gomei went bankrupt in 1927, these two firms were under bank control.  
Another example involved high dividend payments from subsidiary firms to the holding 
company. Furukawa Electric Metal paid over 70% of its earnings as dividends to 
Furukawa Gomei (holding company), which used the dividends to compensate losses at 
its trading businesses.  The pyramid structure of family-owned business groups made it 
possible to entrench managers away from the pressure of outside investors or effective 
monitors, and induced overinvestment, or asset substitution. This was often the case for 
Type II groups, and their overinvestment was supported by their exclusive relationship 
with banks (“organ” bank system).  
The de facto bankruptcies of Suzuki and Kawasaki were glaring examples of the 
zaibatsu dysfunction.  They faced serious financial trouble when the wartime boom 
ended.  However, instead of launching early efforts to reconstruct their businesses, 
both companies adjusted their balance sheets through additional borrowing from related 
banks, which were often called ‘organ banks’. The Suzuki and Kawasaki groups had 
close ties with the Taiwan Bank and Dai Jugo (Number 15 National) Bank respectively.  
Since these banks were heavily committed to both companies, they could not withdraw 
their loans, and instead supplied additional loans, even though both banks were aware 
that drastic balance sheet improvements were essential. The lack of a credible threat 
?????????????????????????????????????????
??? Franks, Mayer and Miyajima (2009) document the price discrimination in the case of Toyo 
Rayon, a second-tier subsidiary of the Mitsui zaibatsu. ?
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induced morally hazardous behavior in both companies typical of soft budget constraint 
situations. Finally, these firms and their banks went bankrupt in the Financial Crisis in 
1927.   
The estimation results of Miyajima (2004, chap.5) support the understanding that 
Type II and III groups are likely to be entrenched from outside investors.  It reports 
that the investments of either Type II or III business groups or firms with high 
managerial ownership are less sensitive to internal funds, and, somewhat surprisingly,  
positively sensitive to the debt-asset ratio in the 1920s.  The lower sensitivity to cash 
flow in the 1920s indicates that Type II and III group firms tended to invest more (or 
even discretionary re-evaluate their fixed assets), whereas the positive sensitivity of 
investment to the debt-asset ratio implies that these family firms tend to invest (or 
re-evaluate their assets) more, when their leverage was high. In sum, there is some 
evidence that some types of Japanese business groups tended to overinvest due to 
entrenchment from appropriate outside monitors. 
     
6.? PERFORMANCE OF BUSINESS GROUPS IN PREWAR JAPAN 
As mentioned earlier, business groups in prewar Japan had both positive and negative 
traits, as did those of other countries. We have examined whether the positive traits 
outweighed, or were overwhelmed by, the negative, and to identify the nature of the 
performance differences between the three types of business groups. 17 
Table 5 summarizes the performance (ROE and annual asset growth rate ?A) of 
business groups and stand-alone firms from 1920 to 1937. The ROE of group firms was 
not higher than that of stand-alone firms in panel A, while group firms showed 
significant rapid growth in panel B. This result is also supported by the conditional 
estimation in Table 6, where ROE and the annual growth rate of assets? are regressed 
on a group dummy, and industry and year dummy (column 1). Even when we include 
size (assets) and the debt-asset ratio in the estimation, all dummy types still had no 
effect (column 3). 
------------------------------------------------- 
  Insert Table 5/6 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
However, interestingly, when we divided business groups into three types, we 
found significant differences in performance between them. First, the ROE and annual 
?????????????????????????????????????????
??? Although the sample coverage, estimation period, and definition of zaibatsu vary, Frankel (1999) 
reports that new zaibatsu had high growth rates, while Okazaki (2001) shows zaibatsu performed 
relatively higher than stand-alone firms. Miyajima et al. (2009) could not find the high performance 
of zaibatsu firms, while reporting the U-shape of managerial ownership and performance. ?
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growth rate of the Three Established Zaibatsu (Type I) groups are at almost the same 
level as that of stand-alone firms.  These results are also supported by the conditional 
estimation in Table 6.  Note that the results are not contrary to the understanding that 
Type I firms performed better, because ROE is significantly positively correlated to 
firm size and negatively to leverage in the prewar period, and they were already 
dominant and had a healthier capital composition at the beginning of the interwar period. 
The results just show that there is no evidence that group affiliation had any actual 
effect on their performance except in terms of economies of scale or capital cost 
advantages.  
Second, Type II groups were low performers, while Type III groups were high 
performers in terms of both ROE and annual growth rates of assets (Table 5).  This 
result remains unchanged after considering other control variables. According to Table 
6, ROE and the annual growth rate of Type III is 2.4% (column 4) and 12.1 % (column 
6) higher than that of stand-alone firms respectively. Business groups with a public apex 
and entrepreneurs performed better during the interwar period.  Accordingly, the low 
effect of all business groups on ROE is a result of the high ROE of Type III groups 
being offset by the low ROE of Type II. Furthermore, the high growth rates of business 
groups that have been observed applies primarily to Type III groups.. 
Table 5 also tests whether business groups had a stabilizing effect of performance.  
It is clear that business groups, especially the Three Established Zaibatsu (Type I) 
groups, were associated with low variance of ROE compared to stand-alone firms.  
Statistical tests in panel A of Table 5 support this difference in variance at the 1% 
significance level. This is the same pattern that was observed for the postwar period 
(Yafeh 2003) and for business groups in other emerging economies (Khanna and Yafeh 
2005).  According to Table 7, where the interwar period is divided into three 
sub-periods (from the collapse of the boom to the financial crisis of 1921-1927; the 
Showa Crisis period of 1928-1932; and the boom period of 1933-1937), the stabilizing 
effect of groups on performance was remarkable in the deflationary period rather than in 
the boom period.  Type I groups in the Showa Crisis most clearly performed such a 
stabilizing function.  This stability might be partly due to the result of risk sharing 
among group firms, but in our understanding, is mainly caused by the strict monitoring 
of affiliated firms by the holding company.  Other types of business groups, especially 
Type II, did not have such stabilizing effects, and rather showed high variance in ROE 
(Type II) and growth rates (Type III). 
------------------------------------------------- 
  Insert Table 7 about here 
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7.? WHAT ARE THE UNIVERSAL AND UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
PREWAR BUSINESS GROUPS ? 
Business groups in prewar Japan have commonalities with those of other countries in 
the sense that they were family owned, and had pyramidical or hierarchical structures 
with highly diversified business portfolios. They emerged as a response to market 
failures in the industrialization process. They also reaped advantages from internal 
markets, while they shared negative traits such as the entrenchment of managers beyond 
the reach of outside investors. Prewar business groups, especially the Three Established 
Zaibatsu, showed a low variance in performance, which was also common to the 
postwar period. What, then, are the unique characteristics of the prewar business groups 
that are relevant to both the postwar Japanese and emerging economies? 
One of the characteristics of prewar business groups is the diversity of internal 
structures and behaviors, as illustrated by the three types introduced in this paper.  This 
organizational diversity distinguished them from the postwar bank-centered business 
groups whose structures and behaviors were homogeneous, partly due to the economic 
reforms of the postwar period? and subsequent regulations.?  
The Three Established Zaibatsu (Type I), which were the first movers, assumed a 
dominant position among business groups in prewar Japan. Their structure was 
relatively similar to family firms in the European continent in that, they delegated 
professional managers to run their businesses at operational and partly strategic level.  
However, families exercised ultimate control, and imposed a significant conservative 
bias on investment and financial policies. The function of the Type I groups was quite 
different from that of postwar bank-centered business groups, which induced high 
investment and high leverage. They were also reluctant to take their subsidiary firms 
public. It is also worth noting that families put their banks at or near the apex (Morck 
and Nakamura 2005), and required them to pursue sound banking policy. These banks 
were never required to finance groups firms in the prewar era, so they were relatively 
free from tunneling issues. 
Type II and III business groups, the Taisho zaibatsu and new zaibatsu respectively, 
were relatively small and latecomers. Their structure was rather similar to family firms 
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in emerging economies in that families or entrepreneurs exercised effective control, and 
were likely to depend on external financing (either equity or debt) to maximize growth.  
Pyramid and hierarchical group structures allowed them to entrench themselves from 
outside investors, and sometime induced tunneling, resulting in volatile performances.  
They also established a blueprint for postwar business groups to take high risks using 
external financing, making it possible for affiliated firms to be less constrained by cash 
flow and default risk.  However, unlike bank-centered business groups in postwar 
Japan, some groups preferred equity financing, and other groups depended on debt but 
were not subject to effective monitoring by banks. 
We should conclude by making a few additional comments on the characteristics 
of prewar business groups.  First, prewar business groups were relatively free from the 
so called “Carnegie Effect”, which has been quite common in business groups in 
emerging economies19. Since the Three Established Zaibatsu delegated their businesses 
to professional managers from the beginning of industrialization, family succession had 
less of an impact on managerial capabilities.  The effective control of new zaibatsu 
(Type III) mainly resided in the hands of talented entrepreneurs, so that once they died 
the group ties was likely to be relaxed rapidly. For example, Nippon Chisso group lost 
its group integrity after founder, Shitagau Noguchi died in 1940.  Family succession just 
remained a significant issue for Type II groups (Furukawa or Asano), where family 
members still had real control. 
Second, the relation between the Three Established Zaibatsu and other types of 
groups could be characterized as complementary, especially since WWI.  
Family-owned (Type II) groups and entrepreneur-type groups (Type III) firms had 
spurts in the boom periods (WWI and 1930s) and assumed enormous risks to enter into 
new industries (nitrogen fertilizer, aluminum, and automobiles).  These Type II and III 
business groups established many of the new high-tech firms in prewar Japan.  They 
were a good substitute for the Three Established Zaibatsu, which were potential 
innovators but often tended to avoid risk. However, these Type II and III groups 
sometimes engaged in over-investment with high leverage, and faced financial difficulty. 
The Three zaibatsu played a complementary role in two ways: 1) they supplied patient 
capital to their affiliates, allowing them to survive the depression period; and 2) they at 
times took the initiative in corporate restructuring through mergers and acquisitions.  
?????????????????????????????????????????
??? The Carnegie Effect refers to the fact that each successive generation of controlling shareholders 
is sometimes less able than the first generation (founders). Hence,  corporate control by heirs 
adversely affects corporate decision making, as they are prone to being less hardworking and ethical 
than the self-made founders. 
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Mitsui & Co. acquired a capital stake in Nippon Flour Mills, and Mitsui Mining 
acquired two former Suzuki chemical firms (nitrogen fertilizers).  
Lastly, we can cite the political stance of the prewar zaibatsu as an additional 
unique feature.  It is true that the government support contributed to growth of 
business groups by the early 20th century (Morikawa 1992; Khanna and Yafeh 2007: 
Table 4). However, as group became larger and matured, business groups were 
relatively independent from the government.  During the interwar, representatives of 
the Three Established Zaibatsu were normally advocates of free trade and laissez faire. 
Members of business groups rarely indulged in political rent-seeking. Rather, the Three 
Established zaibatsu manipulated their country’s political system to entrench themselves.  
It has been documented that zaibatsu members tried to minimize government 
intervention in their activities, while the families of the three zaibatsu adopted house 
rules and constitutions requiring that company members avoid involvement in political 
affairs.20   
 
?????????????????????????????????????????
??? The zaibatsu were not enthusiastic supporters of the Important Industries Control Act of 1931  
(see Miyajima 2004: chap.3). And it is well known that when the chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, Kiyoshi Goko, accepted a post as advisor to the Cabinet in 1943, the holding 
company of Mitsubishi required him to resign his Mitsubishi position on the grounds that it 
violated the house rule against involvement in politics (Miyajima 2004: 314,18). 
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Figure 1? Types of Business Groups 
 
The Holding Company axis denotes whether groups have a holding company at the apex or not. 
The Public-Private axis denotes whether apex and group firms are private or public. The 
Diversification axis denotes the extent of diversification.? The size of the balloons are an 
indication of the relative difference in percentage shares of the assets of the top 100 industrial 
firms in 1937 for each business group type.  
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Table 1? Evolution of Business Groups in Japan: 1878 to 1955 
Year Political Events  Business Group Developments? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
1590                  Sumitomo founds copper business 
1673                  Mitsui opens for business  
1868    Meiji Restoration 
1876? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?       Mitsui establishes banking business    
1886    Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises begins 
1886    Bank of Japan established. 
1890 Original Company Law introduced. 
                      Mitsui Trading, Bank (limited partnership) are incorporated  
1893                  Mitsubishi Company formed after dissolving Mitsubishi partnership 
1894-95  Sino-Japanese War 
1895? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?        Mitsubishi enters into banking business through acquisitions.  
                      Sumitomo reorganizes financial business into bank. 
1899  Commercial Code revised. 
1904-05  Russo-Japanese War/Tax reforms (introduction of income tax created tax advantages 
for corporations). 
1909                  Mitsui Partnership established 
1912                  Yasuda Partnership established   
1914-18 World War I 
1917                  Mitsubishi holding company (limited partnership) with spins off 
former divisions 
Furukawa Unlimited Partnership established.  
Okura Limited Partnership established   ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
1918             ? ?  ? Asano Family Holding Ltd. Established  (Reorganization of Asano 
limited partnership formed in 1914) 
1920  Tax reforms (Give advantages to holding companies). 
1921  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Sumitomo Limited Partnership established,  
                      Furukawa Trading de facto bankruptcy, merged into Furukawa 
Mining   
1923   Kanto Earthquake       
Suzuki Unlimited Partnership established 
1927   Showa Financial Crisis   
                      Suzuki Shoten goes bankrupt, Kawasaki Shipbuilding goes bankrupt  
1928? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?       Ayukawa organizes Nippon Sangyo 
1929 Showa Depression 
1931 Manchurian Incident 
                      Furukawa Bank liquidated 
1932 May 15 Incident 
                      Hitachi, and Nippon Mining (Nissan Group) go to public? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
1934 Accounting statement guidelines adopted. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?        Mitsubishi Limited Partnership sells Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Co.  
                     Nippon Soda goes to public    
1936  ? Feb. 26 Incident 
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Table 1? Evolution of Business Groups in Japan: 1878 to 1955 (contd,) 
                                                                              
1937 Sino-Japanese War erupts.   
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo Limited Partnership reorganized into joint 
stock companies. 
1938   Enactment of State Mobilization Law and revision of the Commercial Code  
1939   World War II breaks out. 
       Corporate Profit Dividend and Capital Distribution Directive promulgated. 
1940? ? ? ? ? ? ?        Mitsui partnership merges with Mitsui & Co (trading company).  
              Mitsubishi Company holds initial public offering.   
1941   Asia-Pacific War begins. 
1943   Munitions Company Law introduced. 
1945   War ends.   
1946   Corporate Reorganization Law enacted. 
Holding Company Liquidation Commission Directive promulgated, zaibatsu dissolution 
begins.  
1951   Holding Company Liquidation Commission disbanded (zaibatsu dissolution ends)      
 
Source: Morikawa (1992) , Hashimoto and Takeda (1992) and other sources. 
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Table 2? The Proportion of Group Firms among largest 100 industrial firms 
 
This table presents trends in the percentage shares of the top 100 industrial firms held by each type 
of corporate group.  We constructed a comprehensive list of the largest firms from Appendix A-1 
and A-2 in Fruin (1992) for 1918 and 1930, and “Honpo Jigyo Seiseki Bunseki” for 1937. For details 
on data set construction, see Miyajima et al. (2009). Group types correspond to those in Figure 1, 
Type I denotes the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo groups. Type II denotes the Yasuda, 
Furukawa, Okura, Asano, Suzuki, and Kawasaki groups. Type IIIa denotes Kuhara and Nissan, and 
IIIb denotes Nihon Chisso, Nihon Soda, Mori, and Riken. 
Source: Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan, Toyo Keizai Inc., Honpo Jigyo Seiseki Bunseki” Mitsubishi 
Economic Research Institute, HCLC (1952) and others. 
?
Panel A : Number of Firms    
Business Group 
Type 
1921 1928 1937 1942 
? 9  14 17 13 
? 9  7 5 7 
? 4  5 8 12 
(?a) (3) (3) (4) (5) 
(?b) (1) (2) (4) (7) 
All Types 22  26 30 32 
     
Panel B : Aggregated Assets of business groups  (one million yen? 
Business Group 
Type 
1921 1928 1937 1942 
? 543  673  1,482  5,283  
? 450  261  250  923  
? 165  264  1,068  3,935  
(?a) (140) (177) (537) (2,088) 
(?b) (24) (88) (531) (1,846) 
All Types 1,158  1,199  2,800  10,140  
100 Firms Total 2,891  4,441  7,839  20,600  
     
Panel C : Percentage share of top 100 industrial firm assets held by 
business groups 
Business Group 
Type 
1921  1928  1937  1942  
? 18.8  15.2  18.9  25.6  
? 15.6  5.9  3.2  4.5  
? 5.7  6.0  13.6  19.1  
(?a) (4.9) (4.0) (6.8) (10.1) 
(?b) (0.8) (2.0) (6.8) (9.0) 
All Types 40.1  27.0  35.7  49.2  
100 Firms Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
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Table 3? Ownership Structure, Capital Composition of Business Groups 
?
Panel A describes the ownership structure, using a sample smaller than the top 100 
industrial firms due to data availability.  C1 is the percentage share held by the largest 
shareholder, C5 is the cumulative percentage share held by the five largest shareholders. 
The definition of business group types is based on Figure 1. Panel B describes the 
capital composition. The statistical significance of the difference of means and standard 
deviations between business groups and stand-alone firms are also reported. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.  
Panel C provides the estimation results for capital composition. Dependent variable, 
DA, is the debt-asset ratio at time t.  SIZE is the log of total asset, K/A is fixed assets 
divided by total assets at t-1. ROE is the three-year average rate of return on equity prior 
to time t. Type dummy is defined in Figure 1. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.  
 
 
Panel A: Ownership Structure ?  ?  ?  ?  
C1 C5 Business Group Type Year N 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev.
1928 13 0.655 0.301 0.831 0.274 
I 
1937 16 0.400 0.202 0.607 0.196 
1928 7 0.378 0.331 0.624 0.347 
II 
1937 5 0.334 0.301 0.514 0.356 
1928 5 0.310 0.262 0.526 0.309 
III 
1937 8 0.408 0.326 0.526 0.289 
1928 70 0.123 0.159 0.235 0.194 
Stand-alone 
1937 63 0.140 0.177 0.256 0.190 
 
Panel B : Capital Composition?Debt-Asset Ratio, 1921-37? ?  ?  
Business Group Type N Mean t-value Std. Dev. F-value 
I 202  0.327  2.179 ** 0.168  1.526 *** 
II 122  0.462  -5.162 *** 0.187  1.229  
III 86  0.391  -1.330 ?  0.137  2.291 *** 
All Types 410  0.381  -1.731 * 0.177  1.366 *** 
Stand-alone 1,183 0.361  . ?  0.207  . 
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Table 3? Ownership Structure, Capital Composition of Business Groups (Contd.) 
 
 
Panel C : Regression results?1921-37? ?  
?  (1) (2) (3) 
?  DA DA DA 
SIZE_1 0.005 0.005 0.005 
?  (0.81) (0.99) (0.92) 
K/A_1 0.078 0.055 0.065 
?  (2.09)** (1.53) (1.79)* 
ROE_1 -0.468 -0.475 -0.462 
?  (8.11)*** (8.35)*** (8.04)*** 
All Types 0.012   
?  (0.93)   
TYPE1  -0.055 -0.056 
?   (3.27)*** (3.43)*** 
TYPE2-3  0.061  
?   (5.01)***  
TYPE2   0.093 
?    (5.93)*** 
TYPE3   0.021 
?    (1.11) 
Constant 0.278 0.287 0.289 
?  (3.95)*** (4.17)*** (4.18)*** 
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1536 1536 1536 
R-squared 0.23 0.25 0.25 
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Table 4? Diversification of Business Groups in prewar Japan 
 
This table presents the business portfolios of business groups around 1937. ? denotes that group firms entered into this sector before 1930. ? denotes that a 
group entered into this sector after 1930. ? denotes that group firms in the sector became independent because holding company sold their holding stocks.  
? denotes group exit from this sector due to low performance (financial distress) before 1937.  Group affiliation is basically identified if a majority (over 
50%) of shares was held by the holding company and other group firms.  The business portfolios of the Suzuki and Kawasaki groups present their profiles 
around 1927 just prior to their bankruptcies.  
Source: Kikkawa (1996), Okazaki (1999), Udagawa (1983), Hashimoto and Takeda (1992) and other sources. 
Manufacturing Marketing Finance 
Business 
Group Type 
Business Group 
Name 
Mining 
Food Fiber Metal Paper Cement Chemicals Shipyard 
Electric 
Machines
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mobile
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Mitsubishi ??
?
? ??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?? 
Sumitomo ?? ?
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
?
?
? ??
?
? ??
?
?
?
? ??
?
?
?
?
?
?
Yasuda ?? ?
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Table 5? Performance Indexes and Business Groups 
 
Panel A and B show the average of ROE and annual growth rates of assets between stand-alone 
and group firms from 1921-1937.  The definitions of group types are the same as Figure 1. The 
statistical significance of the difference of means and the variance deviations between business 
groups and stand-alone firms are also reported. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.  
 
 
Panel A : ROE ?  ?  ?  ?  ?    
Business Group 
Type N Mean t-value Std. Dev. F-value 
I 202  0.072  0.044 ?  0.072  1.845 *** 
? 122  0.056  1.729 * 0.111  0.774 ** 
III 86  0.089  -1.500 ?  0.069  1.989 *** 
All Types 410  0.071  0.299 ?  0.086  1.305 *** 
Stand-alone 1,183  0.073  . 0.098  . ?  
        
Panel B : Asset growth       
Business Group 
Type N Mean t-value Std. Dev. F-value 
I 202  0.090  -1.308 ?  0.216  1.108  
? 122  0.040  1.309 ?  0.170  1.790 *** 
III 86  0.185  -4.491 *** 0.324  0.491 *** 
All Types 410  0.095  -2.093 ** 0.236  0.923 ?  
Stand-alone 1,183  0.067  . 0.227  . ?  
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Table 6? Estimation Results for Performance and Group Affiliation
?1921-1937? 
 
This table shows regression results for performance estimations, using the top 100 firms 
defined in Figure 1. The dependent variable is corporate performance measured by the 
rate of return on equity, ROE, and ?A (growth rate of assets). SIZE is the logarithm of 
total assets (a year lag).  DA is the leverage defined by debt to assets ratio (debt / total 
assets). Type dummy is defined in Figure 1. Industry dummies are also included.  
Observations with ROE or DA more than three standard deviations from the mean 
values are dropped from the sample.  The t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.  
 
 
?  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
Variable ROE ROE ROE ROE ?A ?A 
SIZE_1   0.010 0.010 -0.032 -0.033 
?    (3.70)*** (3.63)*** (3.55)*** (3.63)***
DA_1   -0.101 -0.100   
?    (7.36)*** (7.13)***   
All Types 0.003  -0.002  0.038  
?  (0.44)  (0.27)  (2.76)***  
TYPE1  0.004  -0.007  0.023 
?   (0.58)  (1.16)  (1.39) 
TYPE2  -0.018  -0.012  -0.002 
?   (1.70)*  (1.16)  (0.10) 
TYPE3  0.030  0.024  0.121 
?   (3.62)***  (2.63)***  (4.09)***
Constant 0.076 0.076 0.003 0.006 0.329 0.339 
?  (5.32)*** (5.38)*** (0.09) (0.18) (3.49)*** (3.60)***
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.19 
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Table 7? Performance Variability 
 
This table reports the standard deviation of ROE by sub-periods. The definitions of group types 
are the same as Figure 1. Bold denotes when the null hypothesis that variance of performance 
for each group is the same as that of stand-alone firms is rejected at the 10% significance level. 
 
 
Year All Types ? ? ? Stand-alone 
1921-27 0.095  0.090  0.104  0.078  0.113  
N 148  59  63  26  515  
1928-32 0.082  0.046  0.128  0.067  0.097  
N 125  68  34  23  346  
1933-37 0.058  0.047  0.078  0.045  0.050  
N 137  75  25  37  322  
1921-37 0.086  0.072  0.111  0.069  0.098  
N 410  202  122  86  410  
 
?
